Commit 72a0351e authored by Niels Möller's avatar Niels Möller

* src/dsa.h: Moved definitions of the dsa_verifier and dsa_signer

classes to dsa.c, and deleted the struct dsa_public.

Rev: src/dsa.h:1.3
parent 1d7b6286
......@@ -28,23 +28,13 @@
#include "bignum.h"
#include "publickey_crypto.h"
#define GABA_DECLARE
#include "dsa.h.x"
#undef GABA_DECLARE
/* DSA signatures */
/* The standard says that DSA public keys are at most 1024 bits, i.e.
* 128 octets. We are a little more liberal than that. Note that
* allowing really large keys opens for Denial-of-service attacks. */
#define DSA_MAX_SIZE 300
/* NOTE: These definitions should not really be public. But the
* structures are needed for both plain ssh-dss and spki-style dsa. */
/* DSA definitions */
/* GABA:
/* ;; GABA:
(struct
(name dsa_public)
(vars
......@@ -56,7 +46,7 @@
(y bignum)))
*/
/* GABA:
/* ;; GABA:
(class
(name dsa_signer)
(super signer)
......@@ -66,7 +56,7 @@
(a bignum)))
*/
/* GABA:
/* ;; GABA:
(class
(name dsa_verifier)
(super verifier)
......@@ -74,6 +64,7 @@
(public struct dsa_public)))
*/
#if 0
void init_dsa_public(struct dsa_public *public);
/* parse an ssh keyblob */
......@@ -82,26 +73,24 @@ int parse_dsa_public(struct simple_buffer *buffer,
struct sexp *
make_dsa_public_key(struct dsa_public *dsa);
#endif
struct signature_algorithm *
make_dsa_algorithm(struct randomness *random);
/* Non spki keys */
struct dsa_verifier *
struct verifier *
parse_ssh_dss_public(struct simple_buffer *buffer);
struct verifier *
make_ssh_dss_verifier(UINT32 public_length,
const UINT8 *public);
#if 0
struct lsh_string *
ssh_dss_public_key(struct signer *s);
#if DATAFELLOWS_WORKAROUNDS
struct verifier *
make_dsa_verifier_kludge(struct verifier *v);
struct signer *
make_dsa_signer_kludge(struct signer *dsa);
#endif /* DATAFELLOWS_WORKAROUNDS */
#endif
void dsa_nist_gen(mpz_t p, mpz_t q, struct randomness *r, unsigned l);
void dsa_find_generator(mpz_t g, struct randomness *r, mpz_t p, mpz_t q);
......
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