Commit b1ed21e7 authored by Jesper Louis Andersen's avatar Jesper Louis Andersen
Browse files

Introduce iodata() in the EQC tests.

Introduce a type for iodata() in the EQC tests. Use this type throughout
the tests in order to make sure we can supply iodata() in all places where
we claim we can supply iodata().
parent 797daa65
......@@ -2,6 +2,50 @@
-include_lib("eqc/include/eqc.hrl").
-compile(export_all).
non_byte_int() ->
oneof([
?LET(N, nat(), -(N+1)),
?LET(N, nat(), N+256)
]).
g_iolist() ->
?SIZED(Sz, g_iolist(Sz)).
g_iolist(0) ->
fault(
oneof([
elements([a,b,c]),
real(),
non_byte_int()
]),
return([]));
g_iolist(N) ->
fault(
oneof([
elements([a,b,c]),
real(),
non_byte_int()
]),
frequency([
{1, g_iolist(0)},
{N, ?LAZY(list(oneof([char(), binary(), g_iolist(N div 4)])))}
])).
g_iodata() ->
fault(
oneof([elements([a,b,c]), real()]),
oneof([binary(), g_iolist()])).
v_iolist([]) -> true;
v_iolist([B|Xs]) when is_binary(B) -> v_iolist(Xs);
v_iolist([C|Xs]) when is_integer(C), C >= 0, C < 256 -> v_iolist(Xs);
v_iolist([L|Xs]) when is_list(L) ->
v_iolist(L) andalso v_iolist(Xs);
v_iolist(_) -> false.
v_iodata(B) when is_binary(B) -> true;
v_iodata(Structure) -> v_iolist(Structure).
%% Generator for binaries of a given size with different properties and fault injection:
g_binary(Sz) ->
fault(g_binary_bad(Sz), g_binary_good(Sz)).
......@@ -13,13 +57,15 @@ g_binary_bad(Sz) ->
frequency([
{5, ?SUCHTHAT(B, binary(), byte_size(B) /= Sz)},
{1, elements([a, b])},
{1, int()}
{1, int()},
{1, g_iodata()}
]).
v_binary(Sz, N) when is_binary(N) ->
byte_size(N) == Sz;
v_binary(_, _) -> false.
%% Typical generators based on the binaries
nonce() -> g_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size()).
nonce_valid(N) -> v_binary(enacl:box_nonce_size(), N).
......@@ -95,16 +141,16 @@ failure(_) -> false.
prop_box_correct() ->
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}},
{binary(),
{g_iodata(),
fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()),
fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())},
begin
case nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1) andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
true ->
CipherText = enacl:box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1),
{ok, DecodedMsg} = enacl:box_open(CipherText, Nonce, PK1, SK2),
equals(Msg, DecodedMsg);
equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), DecodedMsg);
false ->
case box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1) of
badarg -> true;
......@@ -115,12 +161,13 @@ prop_box_correct() ->
prop_box_failure_integrity() ->
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, {PK1, SK1}, {PK2, SK2}},
{binary(),
{g_iodata(),
fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
fault_rate(1, 40, keypair()),
fault_rate(1, 40, keypair())},
begin
case nonce_valid(Nonce)
case v_iodata(Msg)
andalso nonce_valid(Nonce)
andalso keypair_valid(PK1, SK1)
andalso keypair_valid(PK2, SK2) of
true ->
......@@ -128,7 +175,7 @@ prop_box_failure_integrity() ->
Err = enacl:box_open([<<"x">>, CipherText], Nonce, PK1, SK2),
equals(Err, {error, failed_verification});
false ->
case box(Msg, Nonce, PK2, SK1) of
case box(iolist_to_binary(Msg), Nonce, PK2, SK1) of
badarg -> true;
Res ->
failure(box_open(Res, Nonce, PK1, SK2))
......@@ -182,9 +229,9 @@ sign_keypair_valid(KP) ->
sign_keypair_public_valid(KP) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KP).
prop_sign() ->
?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair}, {binary(), fault_rate(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
?FORALL({Msg, KeyPair}, {g_iodata(), fault_rate(1, 40, sign_keypair())},
begin
case sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso sign_keypair_secret_valid(KeyPair) of
true ->
#{ secret := Secret } = KeyPair,
enacl:sign(Msg, Secret),
......@@ -218,13 +265,13 @@ signed_message_valid({invalid, _}, _) -> true;
signed_message_valid(_, _) -> false.
prop_sign_open() ->
?FORALL(Msg, binary(),
?FORALL(Msg, g_iodata(),
?FORALL({SignMsg, PK}, signed_message(Msg),
case signed_message_valid(SignMsg, PK) of
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso signed_message_valid(SignMsg, PK) of
true ->
case SignMsg of
{valid, SM} ->
equals({ok, Msg}, enacl:sign_open(SM, PK));
equals({ok, iolist_to_binary(Msg)}, enacl:sign_open(SM, PK));
{invalid, SM} ->
equals({error, failed_verification}, enacl:sign_open(SM, PK))
end;
......@@ -287,15 +334,15 @@ secretbox_open(Msg, Nonce, Key) ->
prop_secretbox_correct() ->
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key},
{binary(),
{g_iodata(),
fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
begin
case nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
true ->
CipherText = enacl:secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key),
{ok, DecodedMsg} = enacl:secretbox_open(CipherText, Nonce, Key),
equals(Msg, DecodedMsg);
equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), DecodedMsg);
false ->
case secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key) of
badarg -> true;
......@@ -306,7 +353,7 @@ prop_secretbox_correct() ->
end).
prop_secretbox_failure_integrity() ->
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key}, {binary(), nonce(), secret_key()},
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key}, {g_iodata(), nonce(), secret_key()},
begin
CipherText = enacl:secretbox(Msg, Nonce, Key),
Err = enacl:secretbox_open([<<"x">>, CipherText], Nonce, Key),
......@@ -327,15 +374,24 @@ prop_stream_correct() ->
badargs(fun() -> enacl:stream(Len, Nonce, Key) end)
end).
xor_bytes(<<A, As/binary>>, <<B, Bs/binary>>) ->
[A bxor B | xor_bytes(As, Bs)];
xor_bytes(<<>>, <<>>) -> [].
prop_stream_xor_correct() ->
?FORALL({Msg, Nonce, Key},
{binary(),
{g_iodata(),
fault_rate(1, 40, nonce()),
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
case nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso nonce_valid(Nonce) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
true ->
Stream = enacl:stream(iolist_size(Msg), Nonce, Key),
CipherText = enacl:stream_xor(Msg, Nonce, Key),
equals(Msg, enacl:stream_xor(CipherText, Nonce, Key));
StreamXor = enacl:stream_xor(CipherText, Nonce, Key),
conjunction([
{'xor', equals(iolist_to_binary(Msg), StreamXor)},
{stream, equals(iolist_to_binary(xor_bytes(Stream, iolist_to_binary(Msg))), CipherText)}
]);
false ->
badargs(fun() -> enacl:stream_xor(Msg, Nonce, Key) end)
end).
......@@ -343,9 +399,9 @@ prop_stream_xor_correct() ->
%% CRYPTO AUTH
prop_auth_correct() ->
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
{binary(),
{g_iodata(),
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
case secret_key_valid(Key) of
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
true ->
Authenticator = enacl:auth(Msg, Key),
equals(Authenticator, enacl:auth(Msg, Key));
......@@ -377,10 +433,10 @@ authenticator_valid(_) -> false.
prop_auth_verify_correct() ->
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
{binary(),
{g_iodata(),
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
?FORALL(Authenticator, authenticator(Msg, Key),
case secret_key_valid(Key) andalso authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
true ->
case Authenticator of
{valid, A} ->
......@@ -395,9 +451,9 @@ prop_auth_verify_correct() ->
%% CRYPTO ONETIME AUTH
prop_onetimeauth_correct() ->
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
{binary(),
{g_iodata(),
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
case secret_key_valid(Key) of
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) of
true ->
Authenticator = enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key),
equals(Authenticator, enacl:onetime_auth(Msg, Key));
......@@ -429,10 +485,10 @@ ot_authenticator_valid(_) -> false.
prop_onetime_auth_verify_correct() ->
?FORALL({Msg, Key},
{binary(),
{g_iodata(),
fault_rate(1, 40, secret_key())},
?FORALL(Authenticator, ot_authenticator(Msg, Key),
case secret_key_valid(Key) andalso ot_authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
case v_iodata(Msg) andalso secret_key_valid(Key) andalso ot_authenticator_valid(Authenticator) of
true ->
case Authenticator of
{valid, A} ->
......@@ -446,14 +502,13 @@ prop_onetime_auth_verify_correct() ->
%% HASHING
%% ---------------------------
diff_pair(Sz) ->
?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {g_binary(Sz), g_binary(Sz)},
X /= Y).
diff_pair() ->
?SUCHTHAT({X, Y}, {g_iodata(), g_iodata()},
iolist_to_binary(X) /= iolist_to_binary(Y)).
prop_crypto_hash_eq() ->
?FORALL(Sz, oneof([1, 128, 1024, 1024*4]),
?FORALL(X, g_binary(Sz),
case is_binary(X) of
?FORALL(X, g_iodata(),
case v_iodata(X) of
true -> equals(enacl:hash(X), enacl:hash(X));
false ->
try
......@@ -463,13 +518,12 @@ prop_crypto_hash_eq() ->
error:badarg -> true
end
end
)).
).
prop_crypto_hash_neq() ->
?FORALL(Sz, oneof([1, 128, 1024, 1024*4]),
?FORALL({X, Y}, diff_pair(Sz),
?FORALL({X, Y}, diff_pair(),
enacl:hash(X) /= enacl:hash(Y)
)).
).
%% STRING COMPARISON
%% -------------------------
......
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